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AN AGENT'S RIGHT TO SUE UPON CONTRACTS.
II.
SEC. 16.-AGENT ONLY MAY SUE ON SEALED CONTRACT OR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT MADE WITH HIM PERSON-

ALLY.-But where a contract under seal is made by the agent in

his own name, there, in accordance with technical rules, the agent
alone is the party in whose name a recovery upon it can be had. 8
So, for other reasons which have often been pointed out,
actions upon negotiable instruments made in the agent's name
only cannot be enforced by the principal in his own name. 59
AGENT's RIGHTS DEPEND UPON THE CONSEC. 17.TRAT.-The liability of third persons to an agent, upon a contract made with him, is to be ascertained by that contract alone,
and cannot be enlarged by reference to any agreement between
the agent and the principal by which their mutual rights are to
be determined. 60
SEC. I8.-RIGHT OF ASSUMED AGENT TO SHOW HIMSELF PRINCIPAL.-The question of the right of one who has
contracted in the character of an agent to throw off this character
and show himself to be the real principal in the transaction, is
one attended with no little difficulty. Every man has the right
to determine for himself with whom he will deal, and he cannot
have another person thrust upon him without his consent. It
may be of importance to him who performs the contract, as
"Shack v. Anthony, i Maule & Sel. 573; Berkeley v. Hardy, q B.
& C. 355; Dancer v. Hastings, 4 Bing. 2; Cleary v. Heyward, 123 N. Y.
Supp. 334; Buge v. Newman, 6i Misc. 84, 113 N. Y. SuppI. i98, 132 App. Div.

928.

See 2 Daniels, Neg. Inst. Sec. 1187.
' Evrit v. Bancroft, 22 Ohio St. 172.
"

23, 46 S. W. 946.

See Tinsley v. Dowell, 87 Tex.
(587)
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when he contracts with another to paint a picture, or write a
book, or furnish articles of a particular kind, or relies upon
the character or qualities of an individual, or has reasons why
he does not wish to deal with a particular party. In all these
cases, he may select the person to whom he will entrust the performance, and, having selected one, he cannot be compelled,
against his will, to accept performance from another.6 '
It is obvious, also, that an attempt to enforce the performance of a contract which is purely executory, involves different
considerations than an endeavor to recover from a third person
the stipulated return for a performance fully executed by or on
behalf of the agent. Equally manifest is it that the fact whether
the agent assumed to act for a named, or for an unnamed principal, is an. important element. These considerations suggest a
division of the question thus: The right of an assumed agent to
show himself to be the real principal: i. Where he contracted
for a named principal and the contract is, (a) executory, or (b)
executed. 2. Where he contracted for an Unnamed principal
and the contract is, (a) executory, or, (b) executed.
SEC. I9.-I.
(a).-A person who has assumed as the
agent of a named principal, to pledge the performance of that
principal to a third person, cannot, while the contract remains unperformed, insist upon substituting himself as the real principal,
without the consent of the other party, in any case in which it
may reasonably be considered that the skill, ability or solvency
of the named principal was a material ingredient in the contract.6 2 If A contracts with B as the assumed agent of C for the
personal services of C, B cannot, by offering to perform the contract himself, recover the stipulated compensation from A. This
principle is too plain to require illustration.
i. (b).-A person who has assumed, as the agent of a named
U Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28, 25 Am. Rep. 9; Arkansas
Smelting Co. v. Belden Co., 127 U. S. 379; King v. Batterson, 13 R. I. x7,
x2o; Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. io6; Boulton v. Jones, 2 H. & N. 564;
Schmaling v. Thomlinson, 6 Taunt. 147.
' Rayner v. Grote, 15 Mees. & Wels, 359; Schmaltz v. Avery, r6 Ad.
& El. (Q. B.) 655; "In many such cases such as, for instance, the case of
contracts in which the skill or solvency of the person who is named as the
principal may reasonably be considered as a material ingredient in the contract, it is clear that the agent cannot then show himself to be the real
principal, and sue in his own name; and perhaps it may be fairly urged
that this, in all executory contracts, if wholly unperformed, or if partly
performed without the knowledge of who is the real principal, may be the
general rule." Alderson, B., in Rayner v. Grote, supra, at p. 365.
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principal, to pledge the performance of that principal to a third
person, may, if the contract has been performed by himself as
principal with the knowledge and express or implied consent of
such third person, compel performance to himself on the part
of such third person, although personal consideratiofis may have
entered into the making of the contract; but where such personal considerations are involved, he can not recover if the performance by himself as principal has been without the knowledge
or consent of the other party. 63 If A contracts with B for the
personal services of C, and B offers to perform and does perform as being himself C, with the knowledge and without the
dissent of A-hence with A's implied consent-B may recover
of A the stipulated compensation; but not if the performance
.In Rayner v. Grote, 15 M. & W. 359, it was held that where the plaintiff made a written contract for the sale of goods, in which he described
himself as the agent of A, and the buyer accepted and paid the price of
a portion of the goods, and had then notice that the plaintiff was himself
the real principal in the transaction, and not the agent of A, the plaintiff
might sue in his own name for the non-acceptance of and non-payment for
the residue of the goods. In Schmaltz v. Avery, 16 Ad. & El. (Q. B.) 655,
proof was given of a charter party expressed to be by defendant of one
part, "and G. S. & Co. (agents of the freighter) of the other," and containing a memorandum as follows: "This charter. being concluded on behalf
of another party, it is agreed that all responsibility on the part of G. S. &
Co. shall cease as soon as the cargo is shipped." No notice of this memorandum was taken in the declaration. G. S. & Co. were proved to be the
plaintiff. Held: That notwithstanding the terms of the charter party, plaintiff might prove that he was the freighter, and his own principal, and, on
proof of being so, was entitled to recover in his own name. In Mudge v.
Oliver, i Allen (83 Mass.), 74, it was held that one who buys goods at a
shop which has been occupied by a person who owes him, under the supposition that he is dealing with his debtor, but is informed before leaving the
shop that another person has become the owner of the stock of goods there
and is selling them on his own account, and makes no objection, but retains
the goods, cannot afterwards resist an action for the price, although the
vendor acquired them by a conveyance fraudulent as to the creditors of the
original owner, and the purchaser himself was a creditor of such original
owner. In Orcutt v. Nelson, 67 Mass. (i Gray) 536, an order for goods
was executed by the successor in business of the person to whom it was sent,
and the goods forwarded by carrier and accepted on arrival, and freight paid
by him who ordered them, with knowledge that the order had been filled by
such succesor. Held, that his assent related back to the original order, and
that the sale was complete on delivery to the carrier. In Barnes v. Shoemaker, 112 Ind. 512, 14 N. E. 367, it was held that where goods ordered of
one person are supplied by another, the appropriation thereof by the purchaser, after notice that they are so supplied, makes him liable, as he thereby
ratifies the transaction, and the ratification relates back and gives the order the
same effect as if it had originally been given to the person filling it. In Bullock
v. Ueberroth, 121 Mich. 293, 8o N. W. 39, it was held that, where B sues
upon a contract, wherein he appears as agent, under which money is payable
to B & Co., he cannot recover without proving that he was doing business
under the name of B & Co., or that B & Co. assigned the contract to him.
See also Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Boston Ice Co. v. Potter,
123 Mass. 28, 25 Am. Rep. 9; Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 93 Am.
Dec. 93.

HeinOnline -- 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 589 1910-1911

590

AN AGENT'S RIGHT TO SUE UPON CONTRACTS

was without the knowledge-hence without the express or implied consent-of A.
SEC. 2o.-Whether, where the contract cannot reasonably be considered to have been entered into from any consideration of personal skill, solvency of other personal reason, it is
competent for one who has contracted as the assumed agent of
a named principal, to show himself to be the real principal, and
recover upon the contract, whether executed or executory, is not
64
clear from doubt. It has been intimated in one or two cases,
that this might be done if notice of the true state of the case were
given to the other party before the action was begun, but no
case has been discovered in which this precise question was presented for adjudication, and no satisfactory reason is apparent
which will permit one, who, in express terms, has made another
than himself the party to the contract, by any mere notice to
change the essential nature of the agreement, or be permitted to
recover, as a party, when he has in terms made himself not a
party. 5 The true rule would seem to be that it cannot be, in
any case, while the contract remains executory, and that, if it
can be done where the contract is executed, it can only be to the
extent that the execution, by the assumed agent as the real prin' Bickerton v. Burrell, 5 Maule & Sel. 383; Foster v. Smith, 2 Cold.
(Tenn.) 475, 88 Am. Dec. 604.
Bickerton v. Burrell, supra, is the leading case in this connection. There
no notice had been given, and it was held that the action could not be maintained, but some of the judges intimated that their opinions would have
been otherwise if such notice had been given. Mr. Bowstead expresses the
opinion that the agent may probably sue in all cases where the identity of
the contracting party is not a material element in the making of the contract,
provided he gives notice to the other contracting party before action that
he is the real principal. Bowstead on Agency, 3 ed., 4Oi. He relies upon
Bickerton v. Burrell, supra. Professor Huffcut was apparently of the same
opinion. Huffcut on Agency, 2 ed., 259, also relying on Bickerton v,
Burrell. Sir Frederick Pollock, after referring to Bickerton v. Burrell,
says: "This leaves it doubtful what would have been the precise effect of
the plaintiff giving notice of his real position before suing; but the modern
cases seem to show that it would only have put the defendant to his election
to treat the contract as a subsisting contract between himself and the plaintiff, or to repudiate it at once." He refers to the case of Fellowes v. Lord
Gwydyr, i Sim. 63; affirmed, i Russ. & M. 83, wherein one who had a contract as agent for a named principal was granted specific performance of
it in equity, the court acting upon the theory that it was just, since the
defendant did not show that he had been prejudiced in any way. Sir Frederick Pollock expresses the opinion that this case is not the law. It was
criticised by Gibson, C. J., in Fisher v. Worrall, 5 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 478.
And Archer v. Stone, before North, J., 78 L. T. Rep. 34, is opposed, though
the facts in that case were somewhat different.
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cipal, has been with the knowledge and consent of the other
66
party.
SEC. 2I.-2.-Where the contract is entered into by the
assumed agent as agent for an unnamed principal, no personal
considerations can ordinarily arise, because since no particular
principal is named or known, no particular elements of skill, solvency or ability are involved. 67 In most of such cases, the words
referring to a principal would, in accordance with established
rules, be regarded as mere descriptio personae, or be rejected
as surplusage. In such a case, the third person must be deemed to
'In Whiting v. Crawford Co., 93 Md. 390, 49 Atl. 615, a broker, without
authority, undertook to make a contract in behalf of a named principal, to
sell certain goods to defendant. Later the broker's want of authority was
discovered, and defendant said that he would hold the broker liable upon the
contract. Afterwards the broker, upon his own credit, obtained from the
seller named in the contract a quantity of the goods which were delivered
to and accepted by the defendant. In an action by the broker in his own
name to recover the price of the goods so delivered, held, that the broker
could recover. The court relied upon Rayner v. Grote, supra, and also quoted
from Woodyatt on Agency, io6, a statement, "it seems that even though
the professing agent names a principal, he will still be exclusively entitled to
sue and be liable, if the other party, though knowing who the real principal
is, nevertheless partly performs or accepts part performance of the contract."
Compare such cases as New York Brokerage Co. v. Wharton, 143 Iowa,
61, 119 N. W. 969, where it is held that where it appears that the apparent
principal was only an agent, the real principal cannot have specific performance
of the contract.
"It is indeed possible, as is pointed out in Schmaltz v. Avery, 16 Q. B.
655, that the other party may have been contented to take any principal
other than the person who posed as agent and may have relied on the terms
of the contract, indicating that the latter was an agent only, being willing
to accept any one else, be he who he might, as principal. (Compare Kayton
v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625, :23 N. E. 24.) In Schmaltz v. Avery, one who
had made a charter party describing himself as "agent of the freighter," was
permitted to show that he himself was the freighter, and to enforce the contract on his own account. The court, after using the language which has
been substantially quoted above, namely, that the other party might have been
relying upon there being some other person as principal, though he did not
know or ask who he was, proceeded as follows: "After all, therefore, the
question is reduced to this; whether we are to assume that the defendant did
so rely on the character of the plaintiff as agent only, and would not have
contracted with him as principal if he had known him so to be, and are to lay
it down as a broad rule that a person contracting as agent for an unknown
and unnamed principal is precluded from saying, I am myself that principal.
Doubtless his saying so does in some measure contradict the written contract, especially the concluding clause, which says: 'This charter being concluded on behalf of another party,' etc.; for there was no such other party.
It may be that the plaintiff entered into the charter party for some other
party, who had not absolutely authorized him to do so, and afterwards declined taking it; or it may be that he intended originally to be the principal;
in either case the charter party would be, strictly speaking, contradicted; yet
the defendant does not appear to be prejudiced; for, as he was regardless
who the real freighter was, it should seem that he trusted for his freight
to his lien on the cargo. But there is no contradiction of the charter party
if the plaintiff can be considered as filling two characters, namely, those of
agent and principal. A man cannot in strict propriety of speech be said to
be agent to himself, yet, in a contract of this description, we see no absurdity
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be liable to some one, and as no one else is designated, it must
be presumed that he is liable to the person who in fact sustained
the relation of principal in the transaction, and this principal
may as well be the assumed agent as a stranger.. In either event,
the rights of the third person are not impaired, because he has
contracted to answer to any one who might be entitled.6"
in saying that he might fill both characters; that he might contract as agent
for the freighter, whoever that freighter might turn out to be, and might
adopt that character of freighter himself if he chose."
In Harper v. Vigers [1909], 2 K. B. 549, plaintiffs, describing themselves

as "agents for owners," made a written contract with defendant to furnish
him a ship to carry a cargo at a certain rate. Plaintiffs were not at that
time the agents of any ship owner, and were in fact making a speculative contract on their own account. They then went to a certain ship owner and,
describing themselves as "agents for merchants," made a contract for the
use of his ship to carry the cargo in question at a lower rate. The cargo
was duly carried and plaintiffs sued to recover the agreed rate from defendant. There were two defenses urged: (I) That plaintiffs could not maintain the action, and, (2) That in any event they could not recover more
than they had paid the ship owner. Both objections were overruled, it being
said that there was no distinction between this case and Schmaltz v. Avery,
supra.
In Rodliff v. Dallinger, I41 Mass. I, 4 N. E. 8o5, 55 Am. Rep. 439, it is
said by Holmes, J.: "There is no rule of law that makes it impossible to contract with or sell to an unknown but existing party. And if the jury find
that such a sale was the only one purported to be made, the fact that it failed
does not turn it into a sale to the party conducting the transaction. Schmaltz
v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655, only decides that a man's describing himself in a
charter party as 'agent of the freighter' is not sufficient to preclude him
from alleging that he is the freighter. It does not hint that the agent could
not be excluded by express terms, or by the description of the principal,
although insufficient to identify the individual dealt with, as happened here;
still less, that in favor of third persons the agent would be presumed without evidence to be the undisclosed principal, although expressly excluded."
In Sharman v. Brandt, L. R., 6 Q. B. 720, on a contract of sale of goods
within the Statute of Frauds, a broker who had signed a memorandum as
broker for a principal not named, undertook to sue upon the contract in his
own name. It was held that the action could not be maintained. If the contract were to be deemed a contract made on his own account, the memorandum, under the case of Wright v. Dannah, 2 Camp. 2o3, was insufficient,
because the agent to sign must be a third person. Moreover, "the note does
not describe the true contract as to the parties, which it must do; for it
describes a contract between the broker on behalf of unnamed principals as
sellers, and the defendants as purchasers; whereas, in reality, the plaintiff
now says, the contract was between the broker as principal and the defendants."
In the case of Paine v. Loeb, 96 Fed. 164, 37 C. C. A. 434, plaintiffs, as
brokers, entered into a contract for the purchase from defendant of certain
bonds claiming to act for an undisclosed principal, and stipulating that they
should in no manner be held liable on the contract, which, as they had reason
to believe, was made by defendant under a misapprehension as to the value
of the bonds. In fact, they were acting for themselves and there was no
other principal. Held, that they could not maintain an action on the contractnot as agents for an undisclosed principal, because no such principal existed;
nor as principals, because, by their fraudulent misrepresentations, they had
secured immunity from liability on the contract as such, and estopped themselves from claiming rights which were correlative with such liability.
"See Schmaltz v. Avery, and cases, supra.
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In cases of this nature, it is immaterial whether the claim

be made while the contract remains executory or after it is fully
executed. The other party is, of course, entitled to be informed
as to who the real principal is, whether the agent or a stranger,
that he may have opportunity to avail himself of any rights
which he may have against such principal.
SEC. 22.-AGENT MAY RECOVER MONEY PAID BY IIM
UNDER MISTAKE OR ILLEGAL CONTRAT.-Where an agent pays

out the money of his principal to a third person under a mistake
of fact, or for a consideration which fails, or as the result of
fraud or misconduct of the payee, 69 or where he pays it upon a
contract which subsequently proves to be illegal, if the agent was
ignorant of its illegality at the time, 70 he may sue for and recover
it in his own name. Such an action is, ordinarily, the only remedy by which an agent, who has parted with his principal's money
' Lord Mansfield laid down the rule in an early case as follows: "Where
a man pays money by his agent, which ought not to have been paid, either.
the agent, or principal, may bring an action to recover it back. The agent
may, from the authority of the principal; and the principal may, as proving
it to have been paid by his agent." Stevenson v. Mortimer, Cowp. 805. This
case is followed in Holt v. Ely, i El. & BI. 795. Here L placed in plaintiff's
hand a fund, out of which plaintiff was directed to satisfy certain acceptances;
defendant falsely represented to plaintiff that he held one such acceptance,
and thereby induced plaintiff to pay him the amount of the alleged acceptance
out of the fund. Held, that plaintiff might maintain money had and received
against defendant. In Colonial Bank v. Exchange Bank of Yarmouth, i.
L. R. App. Cases, 84, the plaintiff bank being under instructions from R to
remit his moneys to a bank at Halifax, through the mistake of its agents
paid them to a New York bank for transmission to the defendants, who, on
being advised thereof, debited the New York bank and credited R in account
with the amount thereof, and being afterwards advised of the mistake claimed
to retain and use the moneys in reduction of R's account with them. Held,
that on being advised of the mistake the defendants were bound to repair
it, and that the plaintiff bank had a sufficient interest in the moneys to recover
them as moneys received to their use.
In Langstroth v. Toulmin, 3 Stark. 145, A becomes the purchaser of an
estate sold by the defendant at a public auction, and signs a memorandum
of agreement, in which he is described as the agent of M. N. The supposed'
principal afterwards repudiates the contract; and after notice of the fact
to the agent of the vendor, A pays the deposit money, according to the condition of the sale. Upon its turning out that the title is defective, A is
entitled to recover the deposit in his own name.
"O0om v. Bruce, 12 East, 225. In this case an insurance had been made
on goods from a port in Russia to London, by an agent residing in London,
for a Russian subject. The insurance was in fact made after the commencement of hostilities between Russia and England, but before knowledge of it
reached London, and after the ship had sailed and been confiscated. At the
trial Lord Ellenborough ruled that the agent having effected the insurance
without any consciousness of its illegality at the time, was entitled to recover
back the premium paid, as money had and received by the defendant to the
plaintiff's use, and without consideration as the risk never attached.
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under a mistake of fact, and for which he is answerable to his
71
principal, can reimburse himself.
In such cases, however, as will be seen, the principal, being
the party to whom the money belongs, and for whose benefit it
72
is to be recovered, may ordinarily sue instead of the agent.
Thus an agent who, not being authorized to exchange money
of his principal in his hands, has so exchanged it and received
in exchange a worthless counterfeit bill, may maintain an action
73
in his own name to recover the money paid out by him.
But an agent who has carelessly or mistakenly sold the property of his principal, entrusted to him for sale, for less than the
proper price, the purchaser not being in fault, cannot recover
of such purchaser the difference between the selling price and
the real price, although the agent may have paid such difference
74
to his principal in the settlement of the mistake.
SEC. 23.-WHAT

DEFENSES

OPEN TO THIRD PERSON.name," says Mr. Evans,7 5 "the

"Where the agent sues in his own
defendant may avail himself of all defenses which would be good
at law and in equity:"(a) As against the agent who is the plaintiff on the
record,76 or
"(b) As against the principal for whose use the action is
brought, provided, df course, a principal exists." 77 .
'Kent v. Bornstein, 12 Allen (Mass.), 342; Parks v. Fogleman, 97 Minn.
157, lO5 N. W. 560.

" Stevenson v. Mortimer, Cowp. 8o5.
"Kent v. Bornstein, supra. In such a case it is not necessary to tender
back the worthless bill before bringing the action.
"Hungerford v. Scott, 37 Wis. 341.
"Ewell's Evans on Agency, 387.
"In Gibson v. Winter, 5 B. & Ad. 96, it was held that where a broker,
in whose name a policy of insurance under seal was effected, brought covenant, and the defendants pleaded payment to the plaintiff according to the
tenor and effect of the policy, and the proof was, that after the loss happened, the assurers paid the amount to the broker by allowing him credit
for premiums due from him to them, it was held that although that was no
payment as between the assured and assurers, it was a good payment as between the plaintiff on the record and the defendants; and, therefore, an
answer to the action.
See also Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co., 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 565.
In the case of Bauerman v. Radenius, 7 D. & E. 659, it was held that, in
an action in the name of the agent for the principal's benefit, an admission
of the agent is admissible evidence.
"In Grice v. Kenrick, L. R., 5 Q. B. 340, the plaintiff, an auctioneer, was
employed by W to sell certain goods by auction. W was indebted to the
defendant in 6o I., and before the sale it was agreed between W and the
defendant that any goods the defendant might buy at the auction should go
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SEC. 24.So far as the matter of set-off is concerned,
set-off being the creature of statute, much depends upon the
precise language of the statute. The English statute provided
"that where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and the
defendant" one may be set-off against the other. Under this
statute it was held, that in order to enable the debt to be set-off

it must be a debt due to the defendant from the plaintiff, and,
therefore, that a debt due from the plaintiff's principal could not
be set-off ;78 and other cases have involved a similar ruling. 79 On

the other hand there are cases holding that the right of set-off
does not depend upon the technical identity of the parties, but
upon their identity in interest; and, therefore, that where the
agent sues in reality for the principal's benefit a debt due from
the principal to the defendant may be set-off.8 0 Such a set-off,
in payment of his claim against W. The plaintiff had no notice of this
agreement at the time of the sale. The defendant bought several lots, to the
amount of 49 1., and the plaintiff allowed him to take them away on the
faith of his paying for them, but the defendant supposed he was taking them
in pursuance of his agreement with W. The day after the sale the plaintiff
paid W 9o 1. on account of the sale. Afterwards the defendant informed
the
plaintiff
of the agreement
between
andhim
W;the
and
after this
notice,
the plaintiff,
on the demand
of the
W, defendant
paid over to
balance
due
on the sale, about ioo 1., after deducting his, the plaintiff's, commission and
charges as auctioneer. The plaintiff then sued the defendant in the county
court for the amount of his purchases at the sale. Held, that the defendant
was entitled to the verdict.
In Holden v. Rutland R. RZ. Co., 73 Vt. 317, 5o Atl. lO96, the court,
laying down the rule "that if the action is brought by the agent in his own
name the defendant may avail himself of those defenses which are good
against the agent who is the plaintiff on the record; also of any defense that
would be good against the principal in whose interest the action is brought,"
held, that, where the agent of an undisclosed principal had bought a mileage
book of the defendant railroad and had sued in case for the alleged negligence of the ticket agent in inserting the name of the purchaser, whereby
the plaintiff had been denied the right to use the ticket which he had borrowed
from his principal and had been ejected from the train, the railroad company
might make the defence against the plaintiff that the principal had in the
meantime made or consented to the making of a fraudulent alteration of the
ticket by inserting the name of an additional party in violation of the terms
of the ticket.
In Bierce v. State Nat. Bank, 25 Okla. 44, 1o5 Pac. 195, in an action by a
national bank upon a note, the defendant sought to show that the bank was
merely agent of the original payee, and to recover against the bank a claim
which defendant held against the payee, greater in amount than the amount
due upon the note. Held, that no such claim could be allowed.
" Isberg v. Bowden, 8 Ex. 852. In Tagart v. Marcus, 36 Weekly Rep.
469, it was held that in an action of trover and for goods sold and delivered,
a defendant cannot set-off a claim for unliquidated damages which he has
against a third party on another transaction, although the third party happens
to be the plaintiff's principal.

"For example, see Alsop v. Gaines, i0 Johns. (N. Y.) 396, a case decided
under the Act of i~or, giving a right of set-off "if two or more persons
dealing together be indebted to each other."
'In Bliss v. Sneath, 103 Cal. 43, 36 Pac. lO29, under a statute confining
the right to claims held by the defendant against the plaintiff, a claim existing
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however, as has been already seen, would not be allowed where
the agent, e. g., a factor making advances to his principal upon
the security of goods and their proceeds, has a lien or interest
which would be defeated or impaired by the set-off.8 '
Admissions made by the principal have been
SEC. 25.held to be available to the defendant where the action was for his
benefit though brought in the agent's name ;52 and it has also
been held that where the agent of the principal residing abroad
brings an action in his own name on a contract made with "him
as agent, the defendant is entitled to discovery to the same extent
as if the principal were a party to the action, and to have the
action stayed until such discovery is made.83
WHAT

SEC. 26.-

DAMAGES AGENT

MAY RECOVER ON

CONTRACT.-Where the action is brought by the .agent upon the

contract, he may, unless the principal intervenes, recover the full
measure of damages for its breach, in the same manner as though
the action had been brought by the principal.8 4 The fact that the
damages, when recovered, will belong to the principal does not
affect this right-"5

But where the principal intervenes, the agent, when permitted to sue at all, can only recover to the extent of his special
interest, by virtue of which the action is maintained.
Floyd R. Mechem.
The University of Chicago.
against the plaintiff's principal was held to be available. The rule quoted in
the text from Evans on Agents was quoted and relied upon. In Hayden v.
Alton National Bank, 29 IIl. App. 458, under a statute permitting set-off of
claims held by the defendant against the plaintiff, it was held that where an
agent who had deposited his principal's money in a bank in the name of
"A, agent," sued to recover it, the bank might set-off a claim which it held
against the agent's principal.
'Young v. Thurber, gi N. Y. 388.
" Smith v. Lyon, 4 Camp. 465; Welstead v. Levy, i Mood. & R. 138.
"Willis v. Baddeley (1892), 2 Q. B. 324. This case was distinguished and
not followed in Nelson v. Nelson Line (i9o6), 2 K. B. 217, on the ground
that in the latter case the plaintiffs were not merely nominal parties suing
for the benefit of the real parties in interest from whom discovery was
sought, but were parties who had a real and substantial interest of their own
in the action. Compare Queen v. Glyn, 7 Cl. & Fin. 466, where it is said there
can be no discovery against a person not a party to the record though
charged to be the sole party in interest.
'4 Groover v. Warfield, 5o Ga. 644; United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve,
29 Md. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 5ig; Joseph v. Knox, 3 Camp. 320; Gardiner v.
Davis, 2 C. & P. 49; Dancer v. Hastings, 4 Bing. 2.
Conversely, the agent ordinarily cannot recover more than the principal
could recover if the action were brought in his name. Evrit v. Bancroft, 22
Ohio State, 172.
' Groover v. Warfield, supra; United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, supra.
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